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At the beginning of Metaphysics Γ Aristotle claims that there is a science which is
concerned w ith being qua being. Being’ is said in many senses. Different beings are not
said to be purely homonymous, but rather to be “related to one thing (πρόσ iv)”(1003a334). G.E.L Owen translates this ττρός ευ formula as "focal meaning", and in his paraphrase,
it means that all the “senses [of ‘being’] have one focus, one common element”, or “a
central sense”, so that “all its senses can be explained in term s o f substance and o f the
sense of ‘being’ that is appropriate to substance.” A ccording to Owen, “focal meaning” is
new and revolutionary in Meta.T, and introduces a “new treatm ent o f to on and other
cognate expressions”, which consists mainly in the follow ing tw o thesis:
(1) The “focal meaning” idea contradicts and replaces A ristotle’s earlier view in
the Organon, EE and others that beings differ in different categories, and ‘being’
has various distinct senses.
(2) The “focal meaning” idea makes it possible for Aristotle to establish a
universal science of being qua being in M eta. Γ, w hich contradicts and replaces
his earlier view that because beings differ, a universal science o f being is
\Ύ
im possible.
The influence o f Owen’s interpretation on A ristotelian scholarship cannot be exaggerated.
The notion o f the “focal meaning” has been widely adopted as a technical term and
Owen’s above tw o theses continue to be embraced in their fundam entals.1
32
1 G.E.L.Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in some earlier Wortes o f Aristotle”, in Aristotle and Plato
in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. During and G.E.L.Owen, Goteborg, 1960, 163-90. The quotations
are from pp. 168-9, p.189. The position is further explained in Owen’s “Aristotle on the Snares of
Ontology”, in .Yew Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1965, 69-75), and “The Platonism of Aristotle”, Proceedings o f the British Academy
51 (1966), 125-50. All these papers are colleted in Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. Martha
Nussbaum, Duckworth, 1986.
2Owen, 1960, 168-9,189.
3W.Leszl provides a lengthy criticism of Owen’s interpretation in Logic and Metaphysics in
Aristotle, Padua, 1970), but his work seems largely ignored. The general sentiment towards Owen’s
position is well summarised in M.T. Ferejohn’s remarks that its truth is “put beyond serious dispute
by the relatively plain structure of Metaphysics Γ2” (“Aristotle cm Focal Meaning and the Unity of
Science”, Phronesis, 25 (2), 1980,117). In his recent laudable book, D. Bostock proposes that when
Aristotle in Z1 claims that being belongs primarily and in the simple way to substance, he changes
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In this paper, I try to provide an alternative account o f the π ρ ό ς εν, which shows
that the πρ ο ς εν o f being in M eta. Γ2 is neither new nor revolutionary. Consequently, I
will reject, respectfully, both claim s made by Owen
I. B eing is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς
So far as ‘being’ is concerned, Owen takes A ristotle’s notion o f signification
(verb, σημαίνειν, “to signify) to m ean “sense” or “meaning”.4 Following this usage, to
say that a word has a sense is to say that it has a distinct significatum . ‘Being’ has many
significata and is thus said in m any senses. Being in A ristotle, as is well-known, can
either be the word that is signifying or the things signified. In modem language analysis it
is thought that it must be the word ‘being’ that could have a “sense” or ‘Toca! meaning”,
although Aristotle is dealing more often w ith the extra-linguistic entity, the significatum
more than the word.
‘Being’ has many significata. Corresponding to each o f these, there is a signifying
category. The categories “signify” (C of.4,lb26), and what they signify are “things that
are” (ta onto la20, cf. Topics, 1.9, 103b27). When Aristotle lists “substance”, “quality”,
“quantity”, “relation”, and so on, it is often not clear whether he is talking about them as
signifying categories, or as the signified extra-linguistic beings.5 It is on the conception of
signification that Aristotle affirm s that there are as many beings as there are categories
(M eta Δ 7 ,1017a 23-28). Indeed, the multivocity of being and the theory o f categories are
so closely associated that A ristotle simply calls substance, quality, quantify, etc.
“categories o f being” .6 Accordingly, the study of categories is therefore the study o f
beings. If we can determine how categories differ, we know how beings differ.

his earlier view that there are as many ultimately different beings as there are categories. The
change is mainly based on die priority in definition: “now [in Meta. Z l] he [Aristotle] has come to
the view that there is after all a common element in all definitions, namely substance, and this
notably alters the position” (Aristotle ’s Metaphysics, Books Z and H, Oxford, 1994,67). Clearly this
is in line with Owen.
4 Owen, ibid 1965, 73. Etymologically, σημαίνειν is related to the modem word “semantics”. Not
surprisingly, it has been a matter of dispute how to understand Aristotle’s conception of
signification. While Owen’s understanding (held also by J.Bames (tr.and ed.) Aristotle: Posterior
Analytics, Oxford, 1975,205) tends to be intensional, Ferejohn believes that it is extensional (ibid.
1980,118). C. Kirwan suggests that “to signify” can be either “to mean”, or “to denote” in different
texts (Aristotle Metaphysics, Books Γ, A and E, Oxford, Second edition, 1993. 94). Yet
D.W.Hamlyn claims that Aristotle does not have a distinction between sense and reference ( “Focal
Meaning”, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, 78 (1977-8),1- 18.1977-8, 12). For Aristotle,
signifiers includes not only name, but also verbs, phrases and sentences (Poetics, 1456b38ff ). For a
detailed discussion of this issue, cf. T.H. Irwin, “Aristotle’s Concept of Signification”, in Language
and Logos, eds. M.Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum, Cambridge, 1982, 241-66). He concludes that
Aristotle’s use is unsystematic.
5 As J.LAckrill remarks, “It is careless of him to speak as if it were substances (and not names of
substances) that signify” ( Ackrill (tr.and ed.), Categoires and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963,
88).
6 ai κατηγορίαι του ôvroç, M eta.§\, b28.
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We are therefore led to the two texts in the corpus which provide A ristotle’s full
ten member list o f categories: CatA , and Topics I, 9. ’Usually these two texts are viewed
as presenting different procedures for reaching the sam e list. In both places, categories are
thought to result from different answers to the Socratic “what is it?” question, and the
main difference is that in Cat. 4 different questions are asked about a single thing, while
in Topics 1.9 a single question is asked about different things.7
8 I would like to propose
that these two texts are related in a different and philosophically more significant way.
Whereas Topics 1.9. provides a procedure to explain how categories differ. Cat. 4 displays
the structural relationship o f these distinct categories. Furthermore, Cat. 4 must be based
on Topics 1.9. To see this, let us begin with an analysis o f Topics 1.9, and then proceed to
compare it w ith CatA .
In the Topics scheme, the procedure for arriving at the list o f categories goes like
this: First, one points to different things, asks w hat each o f them is and obtains an answer
to these questions. For instance, if we point to a person, say, Socrates, and ask what the
thing is, the answ er is “This is Socrates”; if one points to a white color, the answer to the
question is “This is w hite”.
Then the second step is: “each o f these kinds o f predicates, if either it be asserted
o f itself, or its genus be asserted o f it, signifies w hat som ething is (τί έστι, 103b36-38)”.
This second step shows that once w e have an ostensive statement, a hierarchy o f
predicates w ill follow. In the sentence “This is Socrates”, the predicate “Socrates” is
asserted of the subject Socrates. Yet this predicate can in turn be a subject and is
predicated by its species word and genus word (e.g. “Socrates is a man” and “A man is an
animal”). In this process, the predicate o f the lower level predication becomes the subject
o f the higher level, and the predicates become m ore and more broad. The hierarchy ends
if it reaches an ultim ate predicate which does not fall under any other. If the series starts
with “Socrates”, the ultim ate predicate is “Substance”; if it starts with “white”, the
ultimate predicate is “quality”; and so on. These ultim ate predicates o f each o f these
hierarchies o f predication are categories. Each o f them signifies a being.
W ithin each hierarchy of predication, the subject o f predication and the objects
predicated are item s o f the same nature. In “Socrates is a man”, both “Socrates” and
“man” share the same kind o f nature. Bn “White is a color”, both “white” and “color” are
items of the sam e nature. Each o f them therefore forms a genus-species-particular
structure. In contrast, “Socrates” and “w hite” are clearly entities o f a different nature, and
cannot form a genus-species relation, and they cannot be in the same hierarchy o f
predication. Thus, the different nature o f these hierarchies o f predication determines a
category’s classificatory function, that is, catégorial difference. I hereafter refer to this
type of predication, in which both subject-expression and predicate-expression are items
in the same category, as the “same-category predication” (for brevity, SCP).
Seen in this way, categories are different from each other because each has
underneath it a different hierarchy o f SCP. For ten categories, there are ten different
“forms” o f SCP, and each category is the ultim ate predicate o f one type o f SCP. The

7 In other places, the number is usually reduced, or the list is open-ended in the form of “so on”, or
‘the rest”, cf. e.g. Meta. Δ 7 ,1017a24-7; Z l, 28al 1-13.
8 Ackrill, ibid. 1963,79-80.
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generation o f a category is related to the type or logical form o f predication. The
difference between categories is determ ined by the types o f predication.
Such a reading o f Topics 1.9 connects this text w ith Meta. Δ7 where Aristotle
says:
All those that the figures o f predication (τ ά σ χ ή μ α τα τη ς κ α τη γ ο ρ ία ς) signify
are said to be in their ow n right (Κ αθ’ α ύ τά δε είναι λ έ γ ε τα ι); for ‘to be’
signifies in the same num ber o f ways as they are said. Since, therefore, among
things predicated some signify what a thing is, some a qualification, some a
quantity, some a relative, som e doing or beings affected, some where, some when,
‘to be’ signifies the same thing as each o f these.9
This passage indeed establishes the correspondence between the figures o f predication,
categories and beings.
Yet why is it the case that beings which are the significata o f categories are also
signified by the figures o f predication? For Aristode, a name signifies, and a definition
(λ ό γο ς) which explains the m eaning o f the name signifies as well. D efinition and name
signify the same thing (Top. 92b26-34; Meta. 1030a7-9). Typically, a definition o f this
type must be genus + differentiae (Top. 142b22-9; 143a29-bl0; 144a5-22). Topics 1.9
shows that categories are the ultim ate predicates o f different forms o f hierarchies o f SGP.
Since in every SCP there is a particular-species (or genus) relation between subject and
predication, each turns out precisely to be a genus + differentia definition which
explicates the sense o f each category member. For Aristotle, definition and name signify
the same thing. So when he says here that beings are significata o f both categories and the
figures o f predication, “the figures o f predication” in this passage should be the same
thing as the different forms o f SCP in Topics 1.9. Both o f them are essence-stating
definitions of categories.10
Aristotle frequently says that “being is said ιτ ο λ λ α χ ώ ς”. The word π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς,
as is well-known, contains what M atthew s calls a “sense-kind confusion”.11 The sentence
can be translated as either (1) “being is said in many senses”, or (2) “being is said in many
9A/eto.l017a22-28: The translation is from Kirwan, ibid. 1993, with the first sentence modified.
Kirwan’s translation is: “All things which signify the figures of predication are said to be in their
own right”. The Greek allows both ways, yet it makes sense that beings in their own right should be
what is signified instead of being signifying terms.
10Such a reading might shed some light on the long standing debate whether category should be
“predication” or “predicate”. The Greek word “kategoricT, from which the word “category”
originates, is from the verb kategorein (“to predicate”), and can be translated either as
“predication”, or “predicate”. Whereas traditionally an Aristotelian category has been understood as
a predicate, Frede argues that in its technical sense ¡categoría literally means “predication” or “kind
of predication”, and in a derivative sense, it also means predicate (“Categories in Aristotle”, in his
Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 1987, 32-35. I tend to believe that the word is used by
Aristotle both in the sense of predication (for various sensible textual evidence, see Frede, ibid.
32ff.) and in the sense of predicates (i.e., when it refers to the single terms such as substance,
quality, quantity, etc. These items are what the modem word ‘category’ refers to). Aristotle can use
the weed in both ways, because only predication can explicate what predicate signifies, and they
signify die same.
n G.B.Matthews, “Senses and Kinds”, Journal o f Philosophy® (1972), 149-157.
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lands”. These tw o translations lead to significantly different understandings. According to
(1), ‘being’ has many distinct senses rather than one single sense or meaning, and is
hence not a unified concept. To be a substance (e.g. “to be a man”) differs from being a
quality (e.g. “to be white”) in what it is for them to be. A ccording to (2), there is a single
meaning or sense o f being which is shared by many kinds o f being. In this case, to be a
substance differs from being a quality because they are different kinds of the same being.
I w ould like to propose the we have to distinguish the different circumstances in
which this phrase is used. When it applies to different categories, as it most often does,12
it must m ean th at ‘being’ is said in many “senses”, since each being as a significatum o f a
category is explicated by a distinct genus-differentia definition. The same word ‘being’
has a different meaning in each category. Hence A ristotle can certainly claim that there is
no such genus as being that stands above all categories.13 There is no single general
definition applicable to all catégorial beings.
The sam e sentence, however, can also apply to different members within the same
category. In M eta. H 2 we read:
C learly then the word ‘is’ is said in ju st as m any ττολλαχώ ζ; a thing is a
threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying
in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a
way. A nd the being o f some things w ill be defined by all these qualities
.. ,(1042b26— 1043al 1).
Threshold is a member o f the category o f substance, and so is ice. They have the same
genus and are members o f the same category. To define them by means o f their location
or special ways o f composition is to give their differentia- W hat distinguishes threshold
from ice is not the nature o f being a substance, but the differentiae that mark o ff different
kinds o f substance. Thus, the phrase “being is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς ” , applied w ithin the
same category, should be translated as “being is said in m any kinds (or ways)”.
Π Cat. 4 and Topics 1.9
N ow let us proceed to the list o f categories in C at. 4. It is usually thought that
there is a single procedure here to generate the list o f categories, that is, to ask many
questions about the same thing. The text itself, however, does not really present such a
procedure. Instead A ristotle simply says: “To give a rough idea, examples o f substance
are man, horse; o f quantity: four-foot, five-foot; o f qualification: white, grammatical; o f a
relative: double, half, larger; o f where: in the Lyceum, in the market place; ...”(2a3-6). It
is from these examples that we can infer that he is asking many question about the same
subject This sam e subject must be a member within the category o f substance, such as a
person, or a person-like entity. For only such a subject can at the same tim e possess
attributions such as “grammatical”, “in the Lyceum”, “sitting”, and so forth. Expressed in
the form o f predication “S is P”, the idea in Cat. 4 is that “S” must be an item o f
substance, w hile “P” could be a member o f any category. I would like to call this form o f
predication the “ substance-subject predication” (for abbreviation, SSP). SSP is clearly
different from SCP which underlies the Topics 1.9. For in SCP, “S” can be a member o f

12See Met. Γ2, and Z l, Physics, 185a21; DA, 410al3; EN, 1096a24.
13 Meta. 998b22-7. An.Po. 92bl4; S.E.172al4-5; ££.1217b35-6; £W.1096a23-7. Cf. also Meta
K.1059Ö31.
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any category, not confined to substance, but “P ” must be the subject-expression’s own
species or genus in the same category. D ifferent predicates answer to different subjects in
the same category, rather than to the sam e subject
SCP and SSP are not parallel regarding category-generation. SCP provides us
with an understanding o f why categories differ, for categories are the ultim ate genera o f
different forms of SCP. In contrast, SSP indicates that all predicates are related to one
subject, but does not explain how and w hy these predicates are different as categories. No
reason is offered here as to why a category can classify things. We lack in Cat. 4 a
principle to justify what constitutes catégorial difference. In A tiP r. 49a6-8 A ristotle says
that ‘“ this belongs to that’ “m ust be understood in as many senses as there are different
categories”. Accordingly, some com m entators argue that since different form s o f SSP,
such as “Socrates is white” and “Socrates is 5 feet tall”, can be paraphrased as “X belongs
to some substance”, we m ust suppose that they introduce different catégorial
relationships, and the items in each d ifférait category are differently related to the
substances to which they b elong.14 I find this interpretation unpersuasive. To say that “to
belong to” has as many senses as categories, is not to say that “to belong to” causes
catégorial difference. On the contrary, it seems that we have to first understand how
categories differ before we understand why “belong to” in these predications have
different senses. What SSP itse lf indicates is that different tilings are related to
substances, not how these thing differ, let alone differ as categories.
I would like to propose that the Cat.4 passage is not intended to explain catégorial
difference. It simply “gives a rough idea”, i.e., to list a few instances o f each o f these
categories rather than explaining w hat each o f them is. In Cat. 2 Aristotle suggests that all
things (that categories signify) can be divided into four kinds according to the ties o f
“said o f’ and “being in”. Cat. 4 introduces SSP. Cat. 5 provides a detailed picture o f how
different categories are related to the prim ary subject based on these two connecting ties.
This context suggests that Cat. 4 is preparing the way for Cat. 5, and that SSP is to show
how other categories are related to substance, rather than why each category counts as a
category. It is the job o f the Topics 1.9 to specify catégorial difference, and the jo b is
done by showing that the catégorial difference is based on the different forms o f
predications. It seems to be the case th at A ristotle first determines the types and numbers
o f categories in the Topics 1.9, and then proposes that these categories are predicated o f
one and the same subject in Cat. 4. C at. 4 m ust have presupposed the catégorial difference
established in Topics 1.9.15
Furthermore, we should be able to say that what is made explicit in SSP must have
been implied in Topics 1.9. First, in the generation o f a category. Topics 1.9 says that we
first point to different things such as a person, a color, a relation, ask “what is it” for each
o f them, which then initiates each series o f SCP up to the final genus. Yet it is clear that
one cannot point to a color w ithout being aware that it is something’s color, and cannot
14Cf. Owen, ibid. 1965,82, nl4; Kirwan, ibid. 1993,2nd.ed., 142
15 As a matter of fact, Cat. 4 does not even mention the word “kategorki”. If Cat.4 is taken alone,
tire list might not be called a list of “categories”. The word, however, appears in other chapters
(twice in ch.5, 3a35, 3a37; and twice in ch.8, 10bl9, 10b21.1 owe the reference to John Anton,
“On the Meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle’s Categories”, in Aristotle ’s Ontology, eds. Anthony
Preus and John P. Anton, State University o f New York Press, 1992X p.15.
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point to a relation w ithout being aware that it is a relation o f certain substances. It is
unlikely that when A ristotle presents his case in Topics 1.9, he is not aware o f the relation
of non-substance categories to substance. What he is doing is to show what it is for each
category to be, isolated in abstract analysis, and he leaves the job o f explaining how these
categories are related to substance to the Categories.
Second, in the Topics 1.9, A ristotle on the one hand claim s that each category
signifies a “w hat it is” (τ ί έστι, ΤορΛ.9, 103b27-29) on the other, the first category,
substance, is also called “what it is” (103b23, 27). Thus, “what it is” appears to have a
broad ami a narrow use. The broad use applies to every category, and a narrow or restricted
use applies only to substance and even serves as a label for substance. This certainly
implies that substance has a privileged position among beings.
It is not difficult to see that SSP in Cat. is precisely the predication form o f the
πρό$ εν structure, for it explains that substance is the common subject o f all other things
and therefore possesses a privileged position. In M eta. Z1 A ristotle claims that “being is
said in many senses”, that is, substance, quality, quantity, and so on, but that which is
primarily is the substance o f the thing”. The reason is that
All other things are said to be because they are, som e o f them, quantities o f that
which is in th is primary sense, others qualities o f it, others affections o f it, and
others some other determinations o f it (1028al 3-20).
In other words, substance is the subject o f everything else. Substance is the underlying
subject Expressed in predication, this picture is SSP.
Meta Γ illustrates the π ρ ό ζ εν formula as follows:
Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are
affections o f substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or
destruction or privations or qualities o f substance, or productive or generative o f
substance, or o f things which are relative to substance,....(1003b6-10).
Expressed in predication, the πρό$ εν is essentially also SSP.
In Γ2 when all other things are πρό$ εν, to substance, substance then becomes the
primary sense o f all beings (003M 7-8). In Z4, it is also explained that irpôç εν o f being
means that being is neither homonymous nor synonymous, and what it expresses is that
“definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they
belong to other things as well in a similar way, but not primarily” ( Meta. Z4, 1030M-6). The
rank of primary and secondary senses (Meta. Z4, 1030a21-24) is, in my view, the same
with the distinction betw een the broad and narrow uses o f “what it is”(7op.l.9 103b27-29;
cf. also Meta. Z l, 1028al2-3). Hence, SSP, the primacy o f substance, and the ττρός εν are
indeed different expressions standing for the same thing.
ΠΙ: The “focal m eaning” o f Owen
The picture w hich has emerged from our above discussion raises some grave
difficulties to Owen’s “focal meaning” interpretation. First, if the πρό$ εν structure o f
being has been im plied in the predication o f SSP w hich lies behind the list o f categories
in Cat. 4, what A ristotle says in Γ says should be traceable to the Categories. Contrary to
Owen, Aristotle in the earlier works o f the Cat. or the Topics also believe that different
beings are connected. Second and more important, w e have shown that SSP and πρόξ εν
are identical, and SCP indicates that there are as many beings as there are categories.
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Owen’s developmental interpretation im plies that there is a real tension between Topics.
1.9 and Cat. 4; that is, between w hat SSP stands for and what SCP stands for. Since no
tension exists between these tw o texts, O w en’s developm ental picture seems foreign to
Aristotle.
This leads us to examine the basis on w hich Owen establishes his arguments.
When Owen claims that Γ 1-2’s introduction o f “focal meaning” involves a “new
treatment o f being and its cognate expressions” and replaces A ristotle’s earlier view that
beings differ, he has three argum ents: (a) There is an earlier period in which A ristotle
believes that being is homonymous; (b ) The introduction o f the Trpôç εν structure in M eta
Γ is new, and (c) The Trpôç εν replaces the view that each being has a distinct sense.
Owen has two pieces o f evidence to justify· h is first position that being is
homonymous in earlier Aristotle: A ristotle directly m entions being as an instance o f
homonym at SE, 182b 13-27; and in th e Topics, when a word is said in many senses, it is
a case o f homonym.16 Neither o f these references, however, is conclusive. The contrast
between the irpôç εν and homonym m ust be qualified. A ristotle appears to recognise that
there are different sorts o f homonyms. H e contrasts the trpôç εν with “com plete”
(ττάμιταν) or “chance” (cbç ετυ χεν ) hom onym {EE 1236al8, b25-6; EN, 1096b26-8),17
or “homonym, and in virtue o f nothing common” {Meta. 1060b33-4). There seems to be
a distinction in Aristotle between a com plete homonym in which a word has many senses
but with nothing common among them , and a non-com plete one in which a word has
many senses, but these senses are related. ‘Being’ can be a homonym in the latter sense,
and is hence not incompatible w ith the trpôç εν form ula.18 Moreover, it is equally
inconclusive to say that multivocity is identical w ith homonym. As Irwin has pointed out,
cm many occasions, “Aristotle im plies that things are multivocal but not
homonymous. 19The alleged identity betw een m ultivocity and homonym is further
undermined if there are different kinds o f homonym. If a w ord has many senses, and there
is no connection among them, it is an instance o f com plete homonym. Yet a word can be
said in many senses, with there being some sort o f connection among them. The
multivocity o f ‘being’ is consistent w ith the latter case, but not the former case.
When Owen claims that the Trpôç εν is a new derice in Meta. Γ1-2, he is aware
that he is challenged by various textual evidence. The rrpôç εν appeared in EE, 1236a7-

“Owen, ibid. 1960,167, n5.
17In EN, it is άφ’ ένό$ instead of rrpôç εν but it has been thought that these two expressions are
not generally distinguished (Owen, ibid 1960, 66, n.7. J. Owens, The Doctrine o f Being in
Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto, 1963,117-8).
lsOwen is fully avare of die existence o f the différait usages o f homonym, but he dismisses it
lightly by saying that “ Often he (Aristotle] takes no notice o f this modification of homonym,
treating homonym as die sole complement o f synonymy where single expressions are concerned”
(1965, 73, n.5). For a full defence of the position that there are two types of homonym in Aristotle,
see Leszl, ibid. 1970, Parts iv-v, Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle”, Review o f Metaphysics, 1981,
523-544 Irwin also believes that “focal meaning” is an instance of connected homonym. But
surprisingly, he does not question Owen’s thesis that in his earlier period Aristotle recognised only
that beings are unconnected.
19Irwin, ibid.\9il, 529-30.
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33, a work Owen believes to belong to the earlier stage. Although there it applies to
“friendship”, the analysis o f the form ula is the same w ith M eta. Z4, 1030a21-24 where it
applies to being, “what it is”, essence, and definition. In both places the Trpôç εν is
neither (strictly) homonymous, nor (strictly) synonymous, but rather it means that the
primary sense o f the term belongs to the first instance.
Owen recognises that the Trpôç εν formula appears in EE, and he also concedes
that it is even implied in some passages o f the Topics. However, regarding its presence in
the Topics, he maintains that A ristotle does not “attach any importance to it”.20 Regarding
the presence o f the irpôç εν structure in EE, he insists that Aristotle “has not seen its
application to such wholly general expressions as ‘being’ or ‘good’”.21 But there is
stronger evidence against Owen. For in the Categories, although the Trpôç εν does not
apply directly to the term ‘being’, it applies to som e catégorial beings, for instance,
“quantity” at 5a38-bl0. Being frilly aware o f this fact, Owen still insists that this “focal
meaning” is “not in that logical ordering o f different categories and different senses o f
‘being’ which lies at the root o f the argument in M eta. IV”22. However, the Trpôç εν is
used to establish the priority o f substance over other categories, and such a priority is
demonstrated in Cat. 5. Again, Owen claims that “this priority was o f an older Academic
vintage which did not involve focal meaning”.23 This is hardly convincing. As we will see
shortly, the ground for establishing this priority in Cat. 5 is essentially the same as that in
Meta. Z1 and Γ2.
Owen makes a strong claim that the idea o f “focal meaning” replaces Aristotle’s
alleged earlier view o f being:
‘Being’ is an expression w ith focal meaning is a claim that statements about non
substances can be reduced to—translated into-statem ents about substances; and it
seems to be a corollary o f this theory that non-substances cannot have matter or
form o f their own since they are no more than the logical shadows o f substance.24
But his major argument for this is to insist that in his earlier period Aristotle does not
recognise the existence o f Trpôç εν structure of being. Earlier we raised objections to this
argument. Given the common understanding between Owen and us that for Aristotle “to
mean” is “to signify”, it is unclear how the Trpôç εν o f being, which indicates that all
others refer to substance, causes other beings to lose their own “matter and form” and to
be reduced to the “logical shadow” o f substance. If a “sense” or “meaning” is associated
with a significatum, the existence o f a “focal m eaning” o f being would require that there
is one common significatum o f ‘being’. Yet in M eta. Z4, Aristotle says that to say a term
has a irpôç εν structure excludes the case that it is about “one and the same thing” (ού το
αυτό δε και εν). 1030Μ-2) and is not “καθ’ εν” (in accordance with one, 1030b4).

“ Owen, ibid. 1960, ,174
2IOwen, ibid. 1960,169
“ Owen, ibid. 1960,175
“ Owen, ibid. 1960, 178
24Owen, ibid 1960,180.
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Although at one point, Owen claim s that in Meta, iv and vi Aristotle is “anxious to
minimise the contrast between synonymy and focal m eaning”,25 he generally makes it
clear that “focal meaning” does not collapse into synonymy, or strict synonym. For Owen,
“the simple dichotomy ‘univocal’ or ‘m ultivocal, synonymous or homonymous’ is not
sophisticated enough to catch such a w ord” and so “focal meaning” is indeed “the tertium
quiet'.26 Nevertheless, in Owen’s discussion, the precise difference between synonymy
and this tertium quid is not quite clear, and w hat “focal meaning” is lacks a needed
precision. Owen is aware o f that but ascribes the ambiguity to Aristotle himself:
Aristotle has not solved the problem o f defining focal meaning fully and exactly
so as to give that idea all the philosophical power that he comes to claim for it: he
has given only the necessary, n o t the sufficient, conditions for its use. But there is
no reason to think that this problem can have a general answer. Aristotle’s evasion
o f it may come from the conviction that any answer would be artificial, setting
boundaries that must be endlessly too wide or too narrow for his changing
purposes.27
IV π ρ ό $ εν
Although Γ2 is generally regarded as the locus o f the πρό$ εν formula, the
chapter does not really do much other than illustrate that substance is the subject o f
everything else by means of a com parison w ith the term s “health” and “medicine”. In
general, Meta. Γ 2 leaves readers with the impression that it is a summary o f discussions
carried out elsewhere. Since we have show n that SSP, the primacy o f being and the π ρ ο ς
εν are different expressions o f the sam e thing (that is, substance is the subject o f
everything else), we can expect a reasonable understanding o f these expressions by
understanding how, and in what sense, substance is the subject o f everything else. The
major texts that provide detailed argum ents for this are Cat.5 and Meta. Z l. Both o f
these texts have been intensively discussed in the literature. The following discussion will
be confined to showing that when these texts argue for the primacy o f substance, they are
not reducing the senses o f other categories to substance. Let us start with Cat. 5.
In SSP, S refers to a substance member, and can be a substantial particular
(primary substance), or substantial species or genus (secondary substance). When S is a
primary substance, “P” includes both (a) secondary substances or substantial universals,
such as “man”, and (b) non-substantial universals. When P is a substantial universal, SSP
is indeed a type o f SCP.
When A ristotle says that both secondary substances and non-substantial universals
are predicated o f primary substance, he makes it clear that these two kinds o f predicates
have different natures. When secondary substances are predicated o f primary substance,
both their names and their definitions can be predicated o f primary substance. We say
“Socrates is a m an”, and since “rational animal” is the definition o f “man”, we can also
25 Owen, 1960,185. Aristotle does say in one place that die πρός εν is “in a sense” (τρόπον τινα)
synonymous” (M etaT 2, 1003bl4-15). One might think, as is the case with homonym, there is a
distinction between a strict synonym and a loose sense of synonym. But the point is not developed
by Aristotle. Ιη.Γ 2, 1003b 14-15 he seems to be talking in an analogical sense.
260wen, ibid. 1960, 179; ibid. 1966,146.
27 Owen, ibid. 1960,189.
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say “Socrates is a rational anim al”. Such a predicate reveals w hat prim ary substance is, its
essence. On the other hand, when the non-substantial universals are predicated o f primary
substance, only their names (more properly, their adjective form s) are predicated, but not
their definitions. We can say “Socrates is white”, but we cannot say “Socrates is a kind o f
color”. Hence, in SSP, non-substantial predicates cannot explain what primary substance
is and are therefore accidental predicates. “W hite” does not signify what “Socrates” is
and so its definition cannot explicate this significatum. In contrast, secondary substances
are essential predicates. The name “man” signifies w hat Socrates is, and its definition
explicates this significatum , and so can apply to explaining what Socrates is. This
distinction suggests that the definition o f a non-substance category and the definition o f
substance are different. Since definition explains what a name signifies, Aristotle clearly
implies that different categories have different significata.28
Cat. 5 presents the structure o f reality as follows: “A ll the other things are either
said o f the primary substances as subject or are in them as subjects” (Cat. 2bl4-5). That is
the picture o f SSP, and the ontological implication o f it is that “If the primary substances
did not exist it would be im possible for any o f the other things to exist” (Ca/.2b5-6;
cf.2bl5-17, 2b37-38). W hat is demonstrated here is the ontological asymmetry between
substances and non-substance categories, that is, the significatum o f the category o f
substance underlies the significata o f other categories. Since A ristotle still claims that
each non-substance category has its own definition, this ontological dependency does not
amount to sense-reduction.
The ontological dependency o f other categories upon substance is argued in more
detail in M eta Z l. O ther categories, according to Z l, cannot exist independent o f
substance, because substance “underlies” them. The expression o f any non-substance
category will always imply some reference to a substance (that is, SSP). To say that this is
a quality implies that it is a quality o f some substance, yet to say that a substance is does
not imply anything about other categories. Accordingly, “that w hich is primarily and is
simply (not is som ething) m ust be substance” (1028a30-31).
Having claimed that substance is being in its prim ary sense on the basis of
ontological priority, A ristotle further specifies that the prim acy o f substance over other
categories can be understood in three ways: natural priority, priority in definition, and
priority in knowledge. N atural priority means that “o f the other categories none can exist
separately, but only substance” (1028a34-35). Priority in definition—or what is usually
called logical priority— means that die definition o f substance must be inherent
(ένυπάρχειν) in the definitions o f other categories (1028a34-6). Priority in knowledge
means that “we know each particular thing most truly when we know what ‘man’ or ‘fire’
is, rather than its qualify or quantify or position”.29
28 It must be noted, however, dial die distinction between an essential predicate and an accidental
predicate is valid only insofar as SSP is concerned. Each SCP is in fact a case of essential
predication in the sense that the predicate can be [Medicated of its same-category subject in both
name and definition. But when Aristotle discusses the “said o f’ relation in the Categories, he pays
attention only to the individual-species relation of the category of substance, and ignores the same
sort of relation in other categories.
^It should be noted that “the particular thing (έκαστον)” in the passage must refer to substance,
and Aristotle is talking only about SSP in which substantial predicates reveal what a substance is.

The idea o f the priority in definition deserves special attention. Some
commentators argue that since others categories contain a substance’s definition in theirs,
they must share a common element. Accordingly, Ferejohn argues that this is what the
“focal meaning” should be,30and Bostock proposes that this implies an alteration o f
A ristotle’s earlier position.31 But this does not seem to me to be what the priority in
definition im plies. As mentioned earlier, for A ristotle, definition and names signify the
same thing. Each category has its own essence-stating definition. When we define
“white”, for instance, we say “White is a color”. Clearly, the definition o f substance does
not occur here. Since substance is neither the genus o f any other category, nor the
differentia, its presence does not seem to alter the distinct sense that each category’s
genus + differentia explicates. Otherwise, we would again need a common significatum.
Then, what does it mean to say that the definition o f substance is present in the definitions
o f other categories? Judged from the structure o f Meta. Z l, the primacy o f substance is
mainly established on the ontological independence o f substance, and the three priorities are
supposed to be a further specification o f that basic point. I am inclined to think that the
presence o f substance in the definitions o f other categories is ontological rather than
epistemological. It is present in other categories not because it is a part o f their formula o f
definition, but because a non-substance category cannot be separate from substance. The
distinct sense o f ‘being’, on the other hand, is from SCP.
Z l itself presents a challenge to the sense-reduction interpretation. W hen Aristotle
argues forcefully that substance is the prim ary sense o f being, he is aware that people
might question the distinctness o f other beings:
So one might raise the question w hether ‘to w alk’ and ‘to be healthy’ and to ‘sit’
signify in each case something that is, and sim ilarly in any other case o f this sort
(1028a20-22).
Z l does not deal with the issue directly. N evertheless it maintains that “we know each of
these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is” (1028b 1-2).
That is, each non-substance category has its own “what it is”. Apparently, Aristotle
him self does not believe that the prim acy o f substance alters the “what it is” o f other
categories.
Thus, SSP and SCP have different functions. While SCP indicates catégorial
difference, SSP or the π ρ ο ς εν stands for a structure o f ontological dependency.
A ristotle’s view in this regard is rem arkably consistent.
V. B eings: p er se and per acciden
SCP indicates that being has its own sense, as “being per se” (καθ’corro, usually
translated as “in its own right”, Meta. Δ 7, 1017a23). Per se is in contrast to “per
acciden” ( κατά συμβεβηκός, “accident” or “coincident”). SSP, on the other hand, indicates
that every non-substance category is predicated o f substance and is accidental. Thus,

while all other predicates are not because they are accidental. For such a subject, what comes first
must be the knowledge of substance radier than the knowledge of this thing’s quality or size, etc.
However, to know what each non-substance category is in itself, we need to know each category’s
own genus and differentiae. It is necessary to know what substance is, but it is not sufficient
30Ferejohn, ibid. 1981. His discussion is based on EE 1236al8-23.
3,Bostock, ibid. 1994. His is based on M?to.l028a34-6,1045b29-32

given SSP, how can a category still be a per se being? How can a being be both a per se
being and an accidental being? This must be the concern behind the question at
Zl,1028a20-22 (quoted above).
The term p er se in A ristotle turns out to be one w hich itself “is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς ”
ln An. Po, 1,4, A ristotle lists four senses in which a thing can be said to be “per se”.32 O f
which, the second sense (73a38-b4) is about the idion properties and the fourth (73bl0 73b 16} is about a thing’s natural re su lt What interests us are the first and the third senses.
According to the first sense, one thing belongs to another per se “if it belongs to
it in what it is—e.g. line to triangle and point to line (for their substance depends on these
and they belong in the account which says what they are)” (73a35-8). According to sense
(i), X belongs p e r se to Y if it is in Y’s essence or definition. A species or genus is per se
to its sub-level members, for it is in their definitions. A ristotle further believes that if X is
per se Y, Y is also per se X {Meta A 1 8 ,1022a27-8).
The third sense is that, “Things which are not said o f an underlying subject I call
things per se, and those w hich are said o f an underlying subject I call accidents” (73b410). X is per se if it is not said o f som e other subject.
On the basis o f this classification o f the senses o f p er se, it is clear that when
Aristotle says there are as m any categories as there are p er se beings, and that different
figures of predications signify different per se beings, he is adopting the first sense. We
have argued that figures o f predication are the same with different forms o f SCP. In SCP
a predicate as a species o r genus reveals what the subject is, and provides a definition for
the subject. Every SCP is a definitional statement, w hich accounts for catégorial
difference, and explicates w hat a being is. A category is a generic elem ent in any
definition o f its many-layers o f subordinate items, down to the particular. It holds true
necessarily o f all and only the m em bers o f its type. A category is thus per se.
While SCP makes each being a being per se, the third sense o f per se specifies
substance as the only being p e r se, and all non-substance beings as “accidental” to
substance, on the grounds that w hile substance is predicated o f nothing further, “the
things that do not signify a substance m ust be predicated o f some underlying subject”.33
In the third sense, only substance is a p er se being, while other categories are accidental
beings. This sense o f p er se explains precisely the picture that SSP presents. Every non
substance category is predicated o f substance, while substance is n o t It is in this sense
that the contrast between substance and non-substance categories becomes a contrast
between per se being and p er acciden being, or a contrast between being sim pliciter and
being something.34
Thus, if we put Topics 1.9 and Cat. 4 together, put sense (1) and (3) together, the
result is that, while substance is alw ays a per se being, other categories are both per se
beings [in sense (1)], and accidents [in sense (3)]. A non-substance category can both be
per se and per acciden, relative to different senses of per se. Hence these two different
roles are not contradictory. A non-substance category’s status as a p er se being is not
affected by the fact that it is predicated o f substance, for its perseity is achieved through

32All of them are contained also in Meta. Δ18, which is an entry about the tom “per se”.
B An.Po. 1,22, 83a32, cf. 83b25ff..
uAn.Po. 83b18-25,90al0ff; 5£. 167aIff; M eta. 1028a29-31,

its own significatum and its own genus + differentia definition, expressed by SCP. In the
meantime, it is accidental to substance because it is predicated o f the latter, as indicated
by SSP. But SSP is not to determ ine what sense is, but to indicate the ontological
relations o f beings o f different natures.
To summarize what we have said so far, there is no real tension for A ristotle to
say both that (a) being has many distinct senses and is not a genus, (b) all beings are
related to substance and substance is the prim ary sense o f being. For (a) is a thesis about
sense, while (b) is a thesis about the relations betw een categories. Indeed, it is in the
combination o f these two aspects, the com bination o f SCP and SSP that we understand
why being is, in the strict sense, neither homonymous nor synonymous, but is a π ρ ό ς εν
term. Because o f SCP, beings differ and each has its own definition; hence, each being
has, as it were, its perseity. Thus, the term ‘being’ is not a strictly synonymous word.
SSP, on the other hand, makes other beings accidental to substance by setting substance
as subject to all non-substance categories. Because o f SSP, the term ‘being’ is different
from such strictly homonymous term s as ‘bank’ (w hich signifies completely unrelated
things such as “riverside” and “financial institution”). Thus, it is not right to believe that
these two aspects belong to different stages o f A ristotle, or to explain them by appealing
to some development hypothesis.
VI T he science o f being
Now let us proceed to Owen’s other m ajor claim that the introduction o f the π ρ ό ς
tv enables A ristotle to found the universal science o f being qua being and to replace his
earlier view that such a universal science is im possible. It is indisputable that A ristotle
offered us two seemingly contradictory views regarding the possibility o f a single universal
science o f being. At EE 1217b25-36 we read: “For ‘being’, as we have divided it in other
works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some
o f it consiste in being changed and in changing;.. ..A s then ‘being’ is not one in all that we
have just mentioned, so neither is ‘good’; nor is there one science either of ‘being’ or o f the
good”. This passage is sharply in contrast to the announcement o f Meta. Γ1 that “There is a
science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue o f
its own nature” (1003a23-4).
In Owen’s interpretation, these two views are really contradictory. The negative
attitude belongs to Aristotle’s earlier thought when he w as an anti-Platonist, whereas the
positive attitude comes at A ristotle’s later stage w hich “looks more like a revival o f
sympathy w ith Plato’s aims” 35 O w en’s reason for claim ing this is that in his earlier
works Aristotle only believes that ‘being’ is a strict homonym without any systematic
connection in its different senses, w hereas the “focal meaning” in Meta. Γ1-2 unifies
them into a systematic subject-matter, and thus makes a universal science possible.36
Now we have demonstrated that there is not an earlier stage in which A ristotle
believes that being is a strict homonym, and that the πρ οσ ευ structure has been
described in the Organon and other earlier works. There is no tension at all between the
view that beings differ in different categories, and to say that being has a π ρ ό σ εν
35Owen, ibid. 1960,164.
36 Fot Owen, “The inquiry described in M eta IV is not mentioned in the Organon, nor is it hidden
in Aristotle’s sleeve” ( ibid. 1960,178).
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structure. According to this alternative account o f the πρ ό σ εν, it is unlikely to be the
case, as Owen claims, that the π ρ ό σ εν is responsible for a change o f A ristotle’s view on
the science o f being.
In place o f Owen’s interpretation, I would like to suggest that A ristotle’s different
attitudes towards the science o f being result from the change o f his view o f what counts
as a “science” (επισ τήμ η). This change, nonetheless, is an expansion o f the original view
rather than a replacement.
In the O rganon, EE, and som e other works, Aristotle claims that “a single science
is one whose domain is a single genus” (A n P o . 87a38, cf. 74b24-6; 76al 1-2. Let’s call it
“the strict notion of science”). Now in M eta .Y l where the stud}’ o f being whose subjectmatter is the πρ ό σ εν structured beings rather than a genus is called “science”. A
justification is certainly in order. A ristotle explains: “Not only (où y a p μόνον ) in the
case o f things which have one com m on notion does the investigation belong to one
science, but also (ά λ λ α και) in the case o f things which are said o f one nature (π ρ ό ς
μίαν...φύσιν) ” (1003M 2-4). The “n o t o nly...but also” structure o f this sentence suggests
that there are two cases in which a science is possible The first half o f the sentence clearly
refers to the strict notion o f science in An. P o.. If all things must be within a genus, the
name that applies to all o f them must be a synonym. Now Aristotle is saying that the word
“science” applies “not only” to a study w hich is about a genus, “but also” to a study
with a unified subject-m atter based on the π ρ ό σ εν structure. This passage sounds clearly
like a defense for why the study o f being can be called “science”, and it is expanding the
usage of the word “science”.37
When A ristotle announces the establishment o f the science o f being, he
immediately says, “Now this is not th e same as any o f the so-called special sciences; for
none o f these others deals generally w ith being as being. The}' cut o ff a part o f being and
investigate the attribute o f this part” (M eta .T l, 1003a23-25). The prevailing interpretation
goes that Aristotle here is drawing a line between metaphysics and (natural) sciences in
terms of universality and particularity. Yet precisely what their relation is has been
subjected to various interpretations, depending on how one’s ow n understanding o f what
the relationship between philosophy and natural science should be. I would like to
propose that the real issue is a contrast betw een different notions o f sciences rather than a
contrast between the universal and the particular. According to the strict notion o f
science, all sciences have to be special or departmental, for they are concerned with a
genus. It has never been their job to study being in general. Beyond the special genus is
toe field of dialectic. To declare the establishm ent o f a universal science o f being in Meta.
Γ affects nothing at all for such a situation. When Aristotle compares this science o f
being with other sciences, he is actually emphasizing toe fact that, whereas all toe
sciences are concerned with a single genus, this study is not. Since being concerned with
a genus has been one basic condition for a discipline to meet in order to be called a
“science”, this immediate comparison A ristotle is making serves to remind his audience
that the condition is no longer necessary. The two notions mentioned shortly afterward at
1003M2-4 echo this comparison and give it an explanation.
37See note.25.
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In A ristotle’s rigid notion, a science m ust satisfy two conditions. In addition to
being concerned with one genus, it m ust be dem onstrative. Modeled on mathematics and
especially on geometry, Aristotle claims that a science should start from a small set o f
axiomatic first principles which are self-evident (e.g. Top. 100a30-b21; A n Po.76b23-4),
and grasped by nous ( “intellect”, e.g. 1005b5-17; EN 1140b31-1141a8; 1143a35-b3), and
th aï proceed to a laige set o f theorems by deduction. The two conditions in the rigid notion
o f science are connected. For dem onstration can only be conducted within a genus, and
cannot pass from one genus to another "Nor can the theorem o f any one science be
demonstrated by means o f another science, unless these theorems are related as subordinate
to superior” (An.Po. 75b8-16, cf. also 76a21-22; SE 172a36-8).
If being is not within a genus, the study o f it cannot be demonstrative. Hence, when
Aristotle claim s that the study o f being can also be called “science”, he not only looses
the requirement that a science must be about a genus, but he also no longer insists that a
science has to be demonstrative: “There is no dem onstration o f substance and essence,
but some other way o f revealing it” {Meta. E l, 1025M 4-15, cf. also, B2,997a26-32; Γ4,
1006a5-ll). The science o f being is not dem onstrative.38
Accordingly, we are inclined to think that A ristotle denies the possibility o f a
universal science o f bang in his earlier works because he sticks to his rigid notion o f
science in An.Po that a science has to be a dem onstrative, departmental discipline. Now in
M etaT the study o f being can be called “science”, not because this discipline satisfies the
two conditions o f the rigid notion o f science, but because Aristotle departs from that
notion. A study does not have to be about a genus and demonstrative in order to be called
“science”. It is the conception o f science that is at issue.
Consequential to our view that the ττρόσ εν o f being is in the earlier works, a
study o f it should have been there as w ell, although it m ight not be called “science”. This
indeed seems to be the case. When A ristode holds only the rigid notion of science, he
does not deny that there is a study or discipline which covers more than one genus or deals
with inter-category issues. He only claims that such a study cannot be called “science”; he
calls it “dialectic” instead. Dialectic, according to A ristode, is not concerned with a genus,
and is not demonstrative. It deals with the m aterial that is common to or relevant to all the
departmental sciences and all fields o f discourse, and is therefore a universal study
{AnPo. 77a26-31; SE 172al 1-15; Topics. 101a36-b4; Rhetoric 1355b8). This description
n Although Aristotle denies the methodology of the science of being to be demonstrative, he never
offers a positive and explicit account of what its methodology is. In his defence of the principle of
non-contradiction, Aristode’s argument is that although no positive demonstration is possible, its
truth can be shown on the grounds that no one can reasonably reject it (1006a5-l 1-15; 1008bl0-12).
Irwin argues that the defence of PNC is “the model of argument in first philosophy” ( “Aristotle’s
Discovery of Metaphysics”, Review o f Metaphysics, 1977, 223) and names it “strong dialectic” (
Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford, 1988, 175). Yet, most discussion we find in the Metaphysics
does not have such a qualky, and it is not convincing to say that the defence of PNC exemplifies a
universal methodology that Aristotle believes that first philosophy should have. Indeed Robert
Bolton points out that even in the proof of PNC Aristotle’s argument is characteristic of peirastic
elenehus, as described in SE ( “Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics as a Science”, in Scaltsas,
Charles and Gill (eds.). Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle 's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1994,
321-354.
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o f dialectic’s subject-matter sounds very sim ilar to that o f the science o f being. As a
matter of fact, Γ2 explicitly claims th at philosophy and dialectic have the same subject
matter, “Dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all
things (Γ2, 1004bl9-20); and, “D ialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to
know” (ibid. b25-6). The fields that dialectic and the science o f being are concerned with
are indeed mostly overlapping. W hile the science o f being concerns all beings with
substance as the common subject, th is structure has been presented in the Organon.
W hile the science of being deals w ith the first principles o f deduction (1005b7), dialectic
is said to be concerned with “com m on rules in the refutation and deduction” (SE 170a35;
Rhetoric 1358a2-32). W hile the science o f being discusses the contrary term s such as
same and other, like and unlike, prior and posterior, etc. (M eta.r2.1004b30-4, 1005al516), these are already subjects o f dialectic (Meta. B l, 995b 18-25). At M eta T 1004a31-b4,
he even says that if to investigate all these things is not the job o f the philosopher, whose
is it? Since he has already said that they are in the field o f the dialecticians, we have
reason to believe that it is the field o f dialectic that is taken over by the philosopher. The
scope o f the science o f being is expressed in a more systematic and refined way in
Meta.T, but its basic framework, blocks, and timbers are already in the earlier works.
Γ 2, 1004M9-20 suggests th at what distinguishes dialectic from the science o f
being is not the subject-matter, but th eir respective goals. For whereas dialectic is critical,
philosophy is after positive know ledge. Even this distinction, however, has to be
qualified. Dialectic has different senses and functions in the Organon.3904It is described as
critical, examining, testing (SE 170a20-bll, 172al7-b4) and even “destructive” (EE,
1217M6), but it is also described to be “in the spirit o f inquiry” (Topics, 159a25-37),
leading to the discovery o f truth: “For dialectic is a process o f criticism wherein lies the
path to the principles o f all inquiries” (101b 3-4). There is no doubt, for instance, that the
discussions in Topics 1.9 and Cat. 1-5 are not merely critical, but are also, as the science
o f being, about “how thing are” (M eta. 1030a27-b7). The notion o f dialectic which is in
contrast to the science o f being m ust only mean dialectic in its negative sense. The
science of being, despite its overwhelm ing name, and various mysteries that the tradition
has attached to it, turns out to be the successor to the positive dialectic o f the Organon.49

39Cf. C. Kirwan, ibid. 1993,84-5.
40 It is interesting to notice that at one place this seems to be what Owen himself believes when he
says that “the new science is not an axiomatic system; and lest it seem curiously like those nondepartmental inquiries which Aristotle had previously dubbed ‘dialectical’ or ‘logical’ and branded
as unscientific, dialectic is quietly demoted to one department of its old province so as to leave
room for the new giant*’(ibid. 1966, 146).
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